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Mertz: Corporations: Validity of a Contract to Issue Stock for Future Services
NOTE AND COMMENT
It seems extremely unlikely that the legislature would recognize an enforceable right to collect inhering directly in the
creditors, with no right at all in the corporation at the time.
Hence this Section seems to assume an already existing liability
to the corporation, as also is indicated in its language, 'until
the... captal stock,... shall have been paid in.", which clearly
refers to payment to the corporation. Very possibly Judge
Brantly's decision would have been the same had this Section
been argued before him, since he stated that he would bow only
before a positive provision repealing the subscriber's defense.
However, to a mind not already made up, this Section seems
extremely persuasive, particularly when considered cumulatively with the evidence that a corporation has a right to commence business as soon as its certificate of incorporation is
issued.'
-Ben Berg, Jr.
CORPORATIONS: VALIDITY OF A CONTRACT TO
ISSUE* STOCK FOR FUTURE SERVICES
The MONTANA CONSTrruTIoN Article XV, Section 10, contains a clause similar to that found in the constitutions or
statutes of many other states. It provides:
"No corporation shall issue stock or bonds, except for
labor done, services performed, or money and property actually received; and all fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness shall be void.
"
In Kirkup v. Anaconda Amusement Co.' the Montana Supreme Court was called upon to construe the phrase "labor
mAs always is true where presumptions are to be indulged in, they
may point in both directions at once. It would be possible to say
that though this Section's language is unqualified, there still is room
for the operation of the implied conditions; ie., that the operation of
the Section is contingent upon a liability by the defendant to the
corporation so that the implied condition precedent would protect the
subscriber against both the corporation and the creditor under this
Section. Again, it would be possible to consider this statute as being
an extremely enlightened provision seeking to more adequately protect the interests of all persons entitled to such protection, giving the
corporate creditor the amount of relief that he absolutely needs, even
though the stockholder may have a defense against the corporation
under the impoled condition precedent. Both rationalizations are
highly improbable in view of both the history of our CODE, and of the
wording of the Section itself.
*The term "issue" is used herein to mean the allotment of stock as
fully-paid shares--not the mere formal issuance of a share certificate.
'(1921) 59 Mont. 469, 197 P. 1005, 17 A. L. R. 441.
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done, services performed". In that case the plaintiff sued the
defendant corporation for damages for breach of contract, alleging that he and one of the promoters of the defendant had
before incorporation entered into an agreement by which after
incorporation' plaintiff was to sell 4150 shares of the capital
stock at par, and was to receive as his commission either the
415 shares remaining after the sale of 3735 shares, or $4150
cash, at his option. He further alleged that after defendant
was incorporated, it "did agree with plaintiff to comply with
the terms and conditions of said contract," and accepted the
money from the sale of 770 shares, but then refused to retain
plaintiff any longer or accept any more money, and refused
to pay or issue stock. The lower court overruled defendant's
demurrer to the complaint and gave plaintiff $4150 damages,
but on appeal the Supreme Court reversed the lower court, on
two grounds: first, that the complaint failed to show an assumption' of the contract by the corporation on any theory;*
at page 196 in his CASES AND STATUTES ON BUSINESS AssoCIATIONS (1935), treats the Kirkup case as one involving a question
of the issuance of stock for pre-incorporation services, instead of
However, the plaintiff's allegations
post-incorporation services.
(which we must accept as a true statement of the facts, since defendant demurred generally) show clearly that the contract contemplated services to be performed after incorporation.
'in discussing previous cases in which courts had held corporations
liable on the contracts made by their promoters with third parties,
the Montana court seemed unable to decide what name should be
used to describe the grounds on which the corporations were held.
The court considered in turn the terms ratification, adoption, continuing offer, and novation, but apparently felt that no one of them
accurately fitted all the cases. It is submitted that instead of trying
to find a term to describe every type of case the court should look to
the peculiar facts of each case and use that term which most nearly
expresses the apparent intent of the parties. Cf., for the application
of these terms, Fitzpatrick v. O'Neill (1911) 43 Mont. 552, 118 P.
273, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 296; Deschamps v. Lolselle (1915) 50 Mont.
565, 148 P. 335; Words and Phrases (Perm. ed. 1940) Vol. 2, pp. 484485; Vol. 28, pp. 864-894; Vol. 36, pp. 118-138; BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (1927) §47, pp. 156-160; STEVENS, CORPORATIONS (1936) §42,
pp. 187-192.
'Plaintiff's counsel contended that since the agreement sued on was
a promoter'8 contract, It was not necessary for plaintiff to show an
express novation in accordance with strict statutory provisions, but
that a showing merely that the corporation accepted the benefits with
knowledge of the contract would make it liable thereon. The court,
after referring to the Montana statutes on novation (R. C. M. 1935,
§§7460-7463), said that whenever a litigant sets out to plead a novation
of any kind of contract, he must allege four essential requisites: (1)
A previous valid obligation; (2) The agreement of all the parties to
the new contract; (3) The extinguishment of the old contract; and
(4) The validity of the new one. It then held the complaint defective
in failing to allege these four things.
The court admitted that many courts have held corporations
liable, even though no novation was pleaded, on the theories of adop'FREY,
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and secondly (the point pertinent to this comment), that even
if plaintiff had alleged the necessary facts to show such an
assumption, he could not recover, for the original contract by
the promoters was made in violation of the Constitutional provision above and was therefore void.
In reaching its conclusion on this second point, the court
seemed confused. It started out in its interpretation of the
Constitution using the term "issue" of stock, and then in the
next breath switched to the phrase "contract to issue," treating
them for all purposes as synonomous. This is unfortunate, for
there is nothing in the language or spirit of the Constitutional
provision, properly construed,' which forbids the making of such
a contract as the one involved in the Kirkup case.!
To begin with, let us look at the wording of the phrase "No
corporation shall issue stock . . . except for labor done, services
tion or ratification, but said that the facts here alleged weren't sufficient to show an assumption of the contract under either theory.
The holding at this point seems questionable. Plaintiff alleged that
the corporation (to quote, the court) "had knowledge of said contract and did receive moneys from the said plaintiff and did issue its
stock therefore under the terms of said contract, and did agree with
plaintiff to comply with the terms and conditions of said contract."
This ought to be sufficient to show an assumption of the contract by
the corporation, whichever of the theories-adoption or ratificationis used to explain it. The A. L. R. annotation to the Kirkup case
(17 A. L. R. 441) says at page 497: "If a promoter employs labor for
the benefit of a corporation, to be performed either before or after its
organization, with the understanding that it Is to be paid for by the
corporation, the corporation will become liable to pay for it, and
otherwise obligated upon the contract, if after its organization, with
knowledge of the facts, it acknowledges the contract and accepts the
benefits of the services." (Citing cases from 13 states, and Federal
and English courts).
'17 A. L. R. 441, at page 464, says In criticism of the holding in the
Kirkup case: "There is no question that if the contract Is in fact
ultra vires the corporation cannot be bound by it, but the Constitution
permits the issuance of stock for labor performed, and it is common
knowledge that a certain amount of labor is absolutely necessary for
the establishment of the corporation, and other courts have held
that stock may be Issued in payment for such labor."
'It is not clear from the facts given whether plaintiff had at the time
of suit elected to take stock or cash as his commission under the contract. If he had elected to take stock, and was suing for damages
for refusal by defendant to issue it, the construction given by the
court to MONT. CONST. Art. XV, §10 would clearly prevent his recov-

ery for non-delivery. But if he had elected to take cash, and was
suing on that theory, couldn't he contend that the Invalidity of that
part of the agreement giving him an option to take stock should not
prejudice his right to take cash? Or does the presence of the option
to take stock make the whole contract void? The court must have
felt that it does void the whole contract, for if It had felt that only
the option to take stock was void, it would surely have allowed plaintiff to amend his complaint so as to show that he was suing only on
the option to take cash.
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performed. .. ." The obvious import of its language is that
labor or services, along with money. and property, are to be
deemed a valid form of consideration for the issue of corporate stock, as long as that labor has been done or those services have been performed prior to the time of issuance of the
stock. The Montana Supreme Court itself, in the case of Fitzpatrick v. O'Neill,' recognized this construction of the clause,
and the courts of other states have given the same interpretatation to similar clauses in their constitutions or statutes.'
If it is true, as these courts have held, that a corporation
can under this clause validly issue its stock for labor done or
services performed, the next question is: Can a corporation
contract to do the same thing at some future date; i. e., does
the clause authorize a corporation to enter into an agreement
by which X is to perform labor or services for it and the corporation is then to issue stock in return? It would seem that
the only logical answer to this is in the affirmative, in spite of
the holding to the contrary in the Kirkup case. If a corporation is empowered to issue stock today for services X performed
yesterday, it certainly should be able to make an agreement
to issue stock the day after tomorrow for services X is to perform tomorrow. This conclusion is well-supported by the courts
outside Montana, under similar statutory or constitutional proyisions.' Even the United States Supreme Court, in the case
'(1911) 43 Mont. 552, 118 P. 273, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 296. In that case
the Montana Supreme Court upheld the issuance of corporate stock
for promotion services performed before the time of issuance. No
contract appears to have been made in advance of the doing of the
services, though, whereas in the Kirkup case there was such a contract.
'Calivada Colonization Co. v. Hays (W. D. Pa. 1902) 119 F. 202;
Harriage v. Daley (1915) 121 Ark. 23, 180 S. W. 333; Ellsworth v.
National Home and Town Builders (1917) 33 Cal. App. 1, 164 P. 14;
Wamsley v. Brothers (1922) 152 La. 148, 92 So. 766; Bryan v. Northwest Beverages, Inc. (1939) 69 N. D. 274, 285 N. W. 689. See Randall
Printing Co. v. Sanitas Mineral Water Co. (1913) 120 Minn. 268,
139 N. W. 606, 608, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 706, 709. And for a similar
holding under a Tennessee statute providing that only cash or land
at a fair valuation shall be taken in payment for capital stock, see
Jones v. Whitworth (1895) 94 Tenn. 622, 30 S.W. 736.
'Lake Street Elevated Ry. Co. v. Ziegler (C. C. A. 7th, 1900) 99 F. 114
(applying Illinois Constitution to a contract to issue stock in payment for construction of railroad lines) ; Turner v. Fidelity Loan
Concern (1905) 2 Cal. App. 122, 83 P. 62, 70 (contract to issue stock
for "good will, interest, and services in and about the management,
formation, and directorship of said corporation") ; Arapahoe Cattle
Co. v. Stevens (1889) 13 Colo. 534, 22 P. 823 (contract to issue stock
for services in procuring a loan) ; Morgan v. Bon Bon Co., Inc. (1917)
222 N. Y. 22, 118 N. E. 205 (contract to issue stock for services as a
bookkeeper); Shannon v. Stevenson (1896) 173 Pa. 419, 34 A. 218
(contract to issue stock in consideration of defendant's leaving an-

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol2/iss1/9

4

Mertz: Corporations: Validity of a Contract to Issue Stock for Future Services
NOTE AND COMMENT
of Fogg v. Blair," recognized the validity of such a contract
under a like provision of the Missouri Constitution. And it is
interesting to note that in 1929 the Legislature of Idaho (whose
Constitution contains a clause corresponding to Article XV,
Section 10 above) passed a law which expressly sanctions a
contract of this type.'
The facts in most of the cases just cited differ from those
in the Kirkup case in two respects. Do these differences offer
a grounds for reconciling the Kirkup case with the others?
In each of the cases cited, the contract in question was
originally made by the corporation itself -through its directors
after incorporation, whereas in the Kirkup case the contract on
which plaintiff sued was allegedly made with promoters before
the corporation was created and then adopted by the corporation
after it had come into existence. Logically this would not seem
to be a justifiable basis for the difference in holding. And it
is clear from the language of the Kirkup case that the court did
not base its decision on the grounds that the contract was made
other firm to assume the corporation's presidency). For similar holdings under a Tennessee statute providing that only cash or land at a
fair valuation shall be taken in payment for capital stock, see In Re
Ballou (E. D. Ky., 1914) 215 F. 810, and Doak v. Stahlman (Tenn.
Ch. App. 1899) 58 S. W. 741.
In Mas Patent Bottle Co. v. Cox (1932) 163 Md. 176, 161 A. 243,
plaintiff alleged that defendant corporation had made a contract
by which he was to sell 2000 shares of its stock, and that after he
did so, defendant was to issue to him some stock as his commission.
Plaintiff then alleged performance of his side of the contract and
prayed for specific performance and an injunction to restrain defendant from disposing of the promised stock elsewhere. Defendant
demurred on the grounds that the contract violated the following provision of the Maryland statutes: ".

.

. nothing in this Article shall

authorize the issuance of stock or convertible securities for personal
services to be rendered in the future." [CODE PuB. GEN. LAWS SUPP.
1929, Art. 23 §41 (6).] The court overruled the demurrer, saying
"our construction of this provision is that it forbids stock or convertible securities to be presently issued for services to be performed
after such issue," (Italics supplied), and held that the contract
plaintiff sued on was valid because by its terms the services were to
be performed before the issuance of the stock. It is true that the
statute involved here is worded differently from the clause of the
Montana Constitution in question, but its meaning is exactly the
same. Each is so framed as to sanction issuance of stock for services already performed, and to prohibit issuance for services not yet
performed.
10(1891) 139 U. S. 118, 11 S.Ct. 476, 35 L. Ed. 104 (contract to issue
stock for repair and construction work on railway).
uCh. 262, §13 II, LAws OF IDAHO 1929, provides: "Subscriptions for
shares may be made payable . . . with cash, other property, tangible

or intangible, or with necessary services actually rendered to the
corporation. This shall not prevent the corporation's contracting
to pay for future services in stock and issuing the stock under such
contract as the services shall be actually rendered." (Italics supplied).
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before incorporation. For instance, at page 489 of 59 Mont.,
page 1011 of 197 P., the court says:
"It is self-evident that the contract for breach of
which damages are sought in this action is ultra vires, were
it considered the obligation of the corporation on any
theory. It could neither be legally entered into by the corporation in the first instance, nor assumed by it when entered into by promoters in advance of its creation." (Italics supplied)
The other point at which the facts of the Kirkup case differ
from those in each of these other cases (except Mas Patent Bottle Co. v. Cox)" is in the type of services called for by the contracts. Here again it is impossible to find grounds for the difference in decision. If services in procuring a loan (Arapahoe
Cattle Co. v. Stevens)," and services in leaving another employment and assuming a presidency (Shannon v. Stevenson)," and
services as a bookkeeper (Morgan v. Bon Bon Co.),' are valid
consideration under such a provision, services in procuring stock
subscriptions certainly should be. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine a type of service which is more vital to a corporation
than that of selling its capital stock, for every corporation ordinarily must issue at least some of its stock before it can begin
to carry on business. Furthermore, the court in the Mas Patent
case ruled quite positively that services soliciting stock subscriptions are a valid form of consideration for the issuance of
shares of stock.
The court in the Kirkup case cited Webster v. Webster Co."
and Rogers v. GladiatorGold Mining Co." in support of its contentions, but neither of these decisions is in point on the real
question involved here. In the Webster case the services (which
the plaintiff there sought to set up as consideration for the
issuance of some stock to him) were shown already to have been
paid for by the corporation in the form of plaintiff's yearly
salary. The court was thus perfectly justified in holding that
he couldn't set up those same services as consideration for the
stock. And in the Rogers case, the court refused to recognize
the services involved as consideration for stock of the corporation because they were apparently to be performed for the
benefit of a third party and not for the corporation. Clearly
163 Md. 176, 161 A. 243, 8upra note 9.
13 Colo. 534, 22 P. 823, 8uvra note 9.
173 Pa. 419, 34 A. 218, supra note 9.
222 N. Y. 22, 118 N. E. 205, supra note 9.
36 Okla. 168, 128 P. 261, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 697.
1'(1907) 21 S. D. 412, 113 N. W. 86.
-(1932)
"(1889)
1(1896)
"(1917)
"(1912)

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol2/iss1/9

6

Mertz: Corporations: Validity of a Contract to Issue Stock for Future Services
NOTE AND COMMENT
these cases don't support the holding in the Kirkup case, where
the services were being performed for the corporation itself
and had not been paid for in any other way.
It is hoped that if the Montana Supreme Court is ever
again called on to determine the validity of a contract for issue
of stock in return for services to be performed before the date
of issue, it will overrule Kirkup v. Anaconda Amusement Co.
and follow what seems to be the weight of authority-that such
a contract is valid."
-Arthur C. Mertz.

EVIDENCE:

DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST
IN MONTANA

Much confusion still exists regarding the distinction between a declaration against interest and an admission in the Law
of Evidence.' Under common law rules, it has long been settled
that as an exception to the hearsay rule, declarations of persons
"There is a further ground on which the holding of the Kirkup case
might be questioned: Even assuming that the contract involved is
one looking to the issuance of stock before the services are to be
performed, does it necessarily follow that the contract is utterly void?
The wording of the constitutional provision does not lead to such
a conclusion. Indeed, the fact that it refers to "all fictitious increase
of stock or indebtedness" as "void", whereas in its prohibition against
issuance of stock except for "labor done, services performed," it does
not use the word "void", implies that a violation of this latter prohibition Is not to be treated as an utterly void transaction. A more
reasonable interpretation, and one which would better serve the interests of all the parties involved, would be a holding by which the
third person (plaintiff here) would be bound as a stockholder and
made to pay to the corporation the difference, if any, between the par
value of the stock and value of the services performed. This approach has been followed by many courts in cases involving the socalled "trust fund doctrine" or the "fraud or holding-out theory".
See Kelly v. Clark (1898) 21 Mont. 291, 53 P. 959, 69 Am. St. Rep.
668, 42 L. R. A. 621; King v. Pony Gold Mining Co. (1903) 28 Mont.
74, 72 P. 309; John W. Cooney Co. v. Arlington Hotel Co. (1917)
11 Del. Ch. 286, 101 A. 879; Meyer v. Ruby-Trust Mining and Milling
Co. (1905) 192 Mo. 162, 90 S. W. 821; Corrington v. Crosby (1926)
54 N. D. 614, 210 N. W. 342, 48 A. L. R. 660; Mitchell v. Bowles (Tex.
Clv. App., 1923) 248 S. W. 459; Murphy v. Panton (1917) 96 Wash.
637, 165 P. 1074. It is true that in those cases suit was by creditors
of insolvent corporations to force holders of unpaid stock to pay up
to par value, but the question involved was the same-namely, what
effect should be given to an issue of stock for a consideration less
in value than the par value of the stock.
'THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw
(1898), p. 520. MORAN, THE LAw OF EVIDENCE, SOME PROPOSALS FOR

ITS REFORM (1927) pp. 37-49. 10 CAL, Jums., Evidenwe, §329, p. 1097;
JONES ON EVIDENCE, (4th ed. 1938) §323, p. 600.
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